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Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as
project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware
development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to
the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for
realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support
requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and
New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific
exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability
to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can
present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays
for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays,
and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks
and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study
found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to
underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the
fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns
include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of
heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for
sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g.,
knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground
system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the
operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2
additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in
order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.
I. Introduction
The Discovery Program (DP) is a science program of frequent, mid-class spacecraft missions that perform hi gh-
quality focused scientific investigations. Initiated in 1992, the DP was defined to ensure frequent access to space for
planetary system(s) science investigations, emphasizing missions that can be accomplished under the leadership of
the scientific research community. The DP comprises a long-term series of space science missions that are
independent and uncoupled, but share a common funding and management structure. Since its inception, DP has
successfully completed missions to study the Moon; inner planets, asteroids, comets, and solar wind. Current
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missions in development or operations will continue exploration of the inner and outer planets, asteroids, comets,
and the Moon.
The New Frontiers Program (NFP) is a science program of medium-size spacecraft missions that perform high-
quality focused scientific investi gations. Initiated in 2003, the NFP was defined to pursue planetary missions that
require resources beyond those available in the DP. The NFP comprises a long-term series of space science missions
that are independent and uncoupled, but share a common funding and management structure. The NFP currently
includes two missions to study outer and dwarf planets.
Missions for both programs are selected through an open science competition and can include any science
investigation involving solar system objects except for the Earth and the Sun, which are currently covered by other
programs. D&NF missions are Principal Investi gator (PI)-led, complete, self-standing, and uncoupled Science
Mission Directorate (SMD) investigations. The total cost to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) for each full mission has a not-to-exceed cost cap specified in the Announcement of Opportunity (AO) for
the competition. At the time of this study, the Discovery mission cost cap was $425M and the New Frontiers
mission cost cap was $700M. The mission cost cap covers the complete mission, including spacecraft development,
mission operations, data analysis, and education and public outreach.
D&NF missions are ultimately defined in terms of the science return from the mission. Level I requirements
include the baseline science mission: the full set of scientific requirements identified for the mission, and the
threshold science mission: the minimum set of science requirements below which the mission is not considered
justifiable for the proposed cost. Each PI is held responsible for proper execution of all aspects of the mission,
including implementation and execution within the confirmed mission cost and schedule.
The D&NF programs are managed by a single program office at Marshall Space Flight Center. As uncoupled,
multi-mission programs emphasizing cost-capped PI-led missions, the ability of the D&NF programs to meet their
launch frequency requirements is driven by the ability of each individual project to meet its proposed and confinned
LCC and schedule. Looking at the missions over the history of the D&NF programs showed an increased frequency
of cost overruns (see Figure 1)_
While there was a trend of
increasing life cycle cost growth even in
the earliest D&NF missions, the growth
was contained in the early missions,
showing an average cost growth of --2%
and a maximum of 15% for one mission.
In contrast, the five recent missions
selected for the study showed an
average cost growth of 31%. with one
mission reaching 50%. This growth
directly affects the programs' ability to
fund new mission starts and meet their
objectives to provide opportunities for
the science community to propose and
I
	
J
	 execute solar system exploration
Figure 1. D&NF Life Cycle Cost Growth 	 missions.
Therefore, the D&NF Programs
Manager looked at the cost escapes on recent D&NF missions to identify the primary drivers and determine what
reasonable things could be done as a program to either prevent the cost escapes or manage them better. Five
missions were selected from the two programs based on a recent history of exceeding proposed or confirmed costs.
Those missions covered a spectrum of complexity, cost growth, and maturity and are highlighted in dark blue in
Figure 1. The study process and results are detailed in the final report, "Improving the Life Cycle Cost Management
of Planetary Missions."
The study found that four of the five missions experienced growth in operations costs at or after launch. The
study identified the following issues as the primary operations cost growth drivers:
1)Underestimating the complexity of mission operations
2) Inadequate planning for sustaining engineering
3) Ignoring special requirements for long duration missions, e. g., knowledge retention, software and
hardware refresh, technology evolution, institutional staffin g considerations
The study also indicated that the cost growth could be traced to problems that were embedded as a result of
decisions that were made during formulation (phases A and B). In addition, these same drivers were identified as
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issues during project replans, compounded by a separate finding that, in general, insufficient time was allowed
during replans to fully develop and analyze impacts to the operations concept resulting from the project replan.
At the time of the D&NF LCC study, the five missions studied were well into or past the detailed design phase
(phase C). Two nussions were in operations and one had completed its primary mission. Since that time, the final
two missions have launched and are in operations (phase E) and two additional missions have completed their
detailed designs (phase C). This paper expands the original study and provides a more detailed look specifically at
the operations cost growth drivers experienced by seven recent D&NF missions, all of which have shown or are
showing some growth in operations cost, or a descope of capabilities to contain operations cost growth.
II. Operations (Phase E) Cost Growth
The total cost to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for each full D&NF mission has a
not-to-exceed cost cap specified in the AO for the competition ; that covers the complete mission, including
spacecraft development, mission operations, data analysis, and education and public outreach. At the time of this
study, the Discovery mission cost cap was $425M and the New Frontiers mission cost cap was $700M. Operations
(phase E) costs for each mission are highly variable depending on the type of mission (flyby, orbiter, sample return,
or lander) and the duration of the operational mission. For the missions studied, operations (phase E) costs range
from $18M to $174M.
Figure 2 illustrates the growth in Phase E costs for four out of the seven D&NF missions studied. The primary
axis is the phase E status (percent complete); the secondary axis is the percent growth in the operations (phase E)
costs. One of the missions has
completed its primary science 	 100	 120.0
mission (phase E duration 100%	 90
complete, shown in gray), and	 4 s0	 - ,07.(1 r
therefore will not show any	 E0 70
additional cost growth. However. the	 - 80.0
	
f0	 ^,
remaining three missions are still in	 a
operations and could experience 	 i0	 60.0
additional cost growth prior to
completion.
Of the missions studied, none
showed any significant growth in the
operations cost estimates durun^ 	 a I	 J 0.0
formulation or design (phases A	 t	 z	 s	 n
through Q. However, all missions in 	 'Phase. E Complete (Duration) ^ Phase E Cost Growth at Launch n Total Phase E Cost Growth
operations experienced operations 	 —
cost growth at or after launch. For	 Figure 2. Operations (Phase E) Cost Growth
the one mission in the study that has
completed its primary science mission, the total operations cost increased 100% over the original phase E estimate
in the proposal.
Of the 3 missions not shown in Figure 2, one has shown little growth in operations cost since launch, but only as
a result of a reduction in the science mission duration and a careful replan of residual ground system development
work. The remaining two missions have not yet launched and ; consistent with the study data shown, neither mission
showed any operations cost growth at the end of phase C (Critical Design Review (CDR)). However, one is already
showing an increase in the estimate for operations support costs that will be realized by launch.
III. Operations Drivers
D&NF missions share many similar operational characteristics that differ from other types of missions. First, as
planetary missions, phase E is often dominated by a long cruise to the destination target followed by a relatively
short period of critical science operations. Second, there is often one and only chance to execute the required science
activities. For example, if the science goal is a fly-by of a solar system object, all science data must be collected
within a window of hours to weeks, depending on the type of science measurement. There is no opportunity to
repeat an observation on a subsequent orbit. Even for missions designed to orbit another solar system object;
constraints on mission duration combined with minimum observation durations often result in minimal or no
opportunities to revisit or repeat an observation. Third, as the mission progresses, the rotund-trip time delay for
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conunand and telemetry increases. Typically ; by the start of science operations, the round-trip time delay precludes
real-time ground intervention in critical activities (e.g., encounter or orbit insertion).
These characteristics define the ground system tools, processes, and staffing required for D&NF missions. Some
activities and the associated ground system tools (e.g., monitoring spacecraft health and safety) are identical during
cruise and science operations, while others (e.g., scheduling) are minimal during cruise and extremely intensive
during science operations. Ground system requirements need to take into account the tools and their use in the
science phase, as well as the tools required for routine cruise operations. From a process perspective, conunand
loads for critical operations are typically built well ahead of critical spacecraft and science events and thoroughly
tested using ground simulators, and then execute onboard without ground intervention. For most critical mission
activities (e.g., encounter or deep space maneuvers), the scheduling and load validation can be completed ahead of
time and then executed onboard. However, for missions orbiting a solar system object , the need for sustained
operational scheduling and load validation levies additional requirements on science phase tools and staffing.
Finally, containing operations costs typically dictates minimizing staffin g during cruise, but the intensity of
operations at the science target dictates a full complement of fully-trained operations personnel able to "hit the
ground running-".
IV. Cost Growth Drivers
Cost overruns for the D&NF missions studied range from 35% to 100% of the initial (proposed) operations cost
(Figure 2). This study found that the drivers behind these overruns include late identification and underestimation of
operations requirements, particularly science requirements and fault management support: underestimation of the
overall mission complexity: overly optimistic assumptions about herita ge and new technology implementation:
development delayed into phase E: development discipline during phase E, overly optimistic assumptions and
underestimation of sustaining
engineering	 support	 and
knowledge retention for long
duration missions. Figure 3
shows how these drivers	 2 aa
breakdown across the missions
studied: the following paragraphs 	 r 1
discuss each of these drivers in
more detail. The drivers were
apparent both in the initial %ro 	 ^r	 f.	 1/0	 °Pd	 aP	 'r _s	 r	 o-	 s	 o
estimates developed as part of the 	
^e"P	 r	 °^c^	 ^^^A^	 `^^	 Nf°A^ 	d'	 ^`'°^^
ro osal and conc ept study	 Q:p p sal	 p
development processes, and in
updated estimates during project
replans..
Figure 3. Cost Growth Drivers Identified per Mission
A. Estimation
In the missions studied, all five operational missions experienced phase E cost growth resulting from an
underestimate of the operational requirements. The most common area for growth was in the tools required for
science operations at the science targets. As solar system exploration missions, the differing science objectives
translate into unique science operations activities. This means that while multi-mission operations center capabilities
are typically sufficient, with minimal modifications, for routine command and monitoring activities, each mission
requires unique tools for science schedulin g and operations. D&NF projects estimated ground system development
costs based on reuse of a multi-mission operations center without sufficient detailed requirements and design
analysis of the science operations phase. For example, until recently, most small deep space missions have been
encounter missions with a long cruise phase for planning and testing command sequences that then execute
autonomously during the encounter. Recent missions that include orbital operations for a significant period of time
around the science target, require a more extensive suite of tools to support iterative operations more typical for a
low earth orbiter than a deep space mission. The growth in requirements when these projects began detailed science
planning resulted in significant growth in ground system requirements and development costs, either late in phase D
or well into phase E.
The other area that was found to be routinely underestimated was fault protection and fault management. The
drivers for growth in this area are discussed in a white paper' summarizing the results of a fault management
4
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workshop sponsored by NASA's Planetary Science Division in April of 2008. The impact of underestimating fault
management capabilities on operations is two-fold. First is the obvious increase to phase E costs to complete
development and testing of residual fault mana gement capabilities that are not considered launch critical. However,
the hidden cost is the burden on the operations team to execute the workarounds required to ensure the health and
safety of the spacecraft while the development of automated capabilities is completed, as well as support for fault
management testing prior to operational use. Two of the D&NF missions required augmented staffing, in one case
for up to a year after launch, to support ongoing operations in parallel with testing and validation of fault
management capabilities.
D&NF missions also underestimated the overall complexity of operations activities and therefore the level of
support for planning and executing onboard activities. 'While this was an issue for the initial cost estimates in a
mission proposal, for the missions studied it had the largest effect during project replans. For deep space missions, a
small change to the launch window can have a significant effect on the mission design (spacecraft trajectory to the
science target). In one mission studied, a 3 month launch slip increased the total mission duration by 2 years, the
number of critical events by 50%. and introduced a one year period with 4 critical events. However, there was
insufficient time during the replan for the project to fully analyze the impacts on operations. After launch, phase E
costs increased 80% in large part to accommodate the heavier operational load.
In addition to underestimating the effort required to develop new and unique operational capabilities, the D&NF
missions studied experienced cost overruns resulting from overly optimistic assumptions regarding the use of
heritage technology without sufficient analysis to confirm the operational characteristics of the technology in the
proposed mission environment. D&NF missions often cite previous mission experience and the resulting lessons
learned as justification for streamlined operations during cruise, allowing for reduced staffing over previous
missions. However, two missions failed to realize this reduction due to significant changes in thennal or radiation
environment from the previous missions. Both missions experienced cost growth for augmented engineering staff to
support unique operational activities necessary to ensure the safety of the spacecraft and science instruments or
additional analysis to understand the causes and ramifications of mission anomalies.
For another mission, the full characteristics of a relatively new propulsion technology used to enable the science
mission were not taken into account during prelaunch planning. During cruise, it became clear that differences in
timing between the new and traditional propulsion systems would result in a decrease in usable science observation
time at the target and increased operational overhead. The operational overhead and extension of the science mission
required increases to the both the science and engineering staff during the approach to and at the science target and
an accompanying growth in operations costs.
Projects can also demonstrate overreliance on heritage/multi-mission operations center systems and capabilities.
Many of the day-to-day activities required to operate a spacecraft are routine and similar from one spacecraft to the
next. For example ; the procedures for building and sending commands to a spacecraft, receiving and processing raw
spacecraft telemetry, and monitoring spacecraft performance are very similar, if not identical from spacecraft to
spacecraft. However, that very similarity can lead to complacency in reusing operations concepts without sufficient
analysis to identify key differences, perhaps in timing or complexity, that drive operations support requirements for
a specific mission or mission phase. As one example ; most spacecraft today are operated from multi-mission
operations centers. However, even thou gh the software and hardware in a multi-mission center can be configured
easily to operate two different spacecraft, operating two spacecraft in tandem is inherently different from operating
two independent spacecraft. The operations concept needs to clearly identify these differences, not just rely on the
similarities, in order to drive out resource requirements: software and hardware requirements, configuration or
reconfiguration issues, and personnel for critical operations and contingency response.
B. Scheduling
It is not unusual for deep space missions to plan from the initial concept to take advantage of the long cruise
phase to complete ground system capabilities, particularly science phase capabilities. The critical mission operations
capabilities (e.g., command and monitoring) are completed prior to launch, but science scheduling and processing
capabilities will be deliberately delayed until after launch. Nklule counterintuitive for those who are used to
developing ground operations capabilities for low earth orbiting missions, this delayed development has an
advantage for deep space mission: the delayed development provides a means for justifying the retention of staff
during the long cruise interval, serving to maintain critical knowledge and skills during the cruise to the science
target. However, the approach is not without risk.
Given the long delay before implementation of the science tools, there is a significant temptation to
underemphasize the science phase requirements and design during project formulation. This can be the result of
decisions to limit ground system or science team staffing to control development costs, it can result from the
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pressure of other more time critical spacecraft or ground system issues; or it result from a desire to benefit from the
knowledge gained about instrument operations during development ; integration, and test. However, letting the
science phase requirements and early design work lag behind other spacecraft and ground system, significantly
increases the risk that the tools and development effort will be significantly underscoped in early cost estimates,
leading to cost growth in phase E.
Also, delaying the development of ground system tools into phase E can result in a decrease in development
discipline. Projects in phase E are rarely required to implement earned value management, a valuable tool for
scheduling and tracking development progress. Given the long lead time before tool development, tool designs at the
project CDR may not be at the same level of maturity as other areas of the ground system, yet rarely are equivalent
reviews, including independent experts, held during operations for the remainingdevelopment work. Taken
together, the decreased project management visibility into requirements changes and scope increase, along with the
lack of design maturing, resulted in tool development cost growth durin g phase E.
C. Sustaining Engineering
Sustaining engineering support is another area that is routinely underestimated for the D&NF missions studied.
Projects do not adequately address requirements for hardware and software refresh over the life of a deep space
mission. The primary operational phase of D&NF missions can last up to 10 years with the majority of the time
spent in cruise to the final destination. Yet most missions assume they will use the same ground system hardware
(both for operations and simulation/load verification) for the full mission. On the surface ; this decision keeps phase
E costs down for both the hardware, software tool changes to adapt to the new configuration, and staffing. It also
eliminates the potential mission risk of errors resulting from supporting changes to ground system tools. However,
this assumption can become untenable as a result of operating system upgrades and hardware obsolescence. Long
term, the assumption can actually increase the risk of loss of science in the event that aging hardware fails during a
critical mission event. If a mission is forced into an unplanned upgrade to its hardware/software configuration, the
cost impact goes well beyond the specific hardware or operating system costs. The project must then take into
account maintenance of the software tools and the increased staffing required to support simultaneous
development/testing and operations.
Knowledge retention across the life of a deep space mission is the other area that is routinely underestimated in
D&NF missions. The desire to control costs for routine operations during cruise competes with the need to retain
key personnel, skills, and knowledge to meet the demands during critical operations. D&NF mission proposals
typically emphasis the former, controlling routine cruise operations costs at the expense of science operations at the
target. Then, as planning for the science phase ramps up during cruise, a better understandin g of the need for trained,
expert personnel for science operations causes cost growth in order to bring in additional staff, or to the accelerate
the planned staffing increase to ensure that sufficient staff, and sufficient training opportunities, are available to
bring the risk to science operations down to an acceptable level.
V. Causes and Mitigation
The operations cost growth drivers discussed above can be divided into management issues and technical issues.
The management issues involve the ability to estimate operations development and support resources and
management decisions regarding the scheduling of development in support of operations. The technical issues
revolve around fully understanding the operation of the spacecraft components in the planned mission environment.
In so far as the technical issues generally result from overly optimistic assumptions regarding operational use of
heritage and new technologies or inadequate understanding of the mission complexity, coupled with insufficient
analysis to confirm these assumptions, these could also be generally considered as management issues involving the
allocation of resources and emphasis on mission operations.
In other words, the primary cost growth drivers are not typically technical issues. The "unknown unknowns" are
not drivers for the operations cost growth seen in D&NTF missions. For the missions studied, the primary operations
cost growth drivers are factors that could have been analyzed, understood, and estimated based on the original or
replan operations concept. Thus, the underlying causes for the operations cost growth drivers are managerial in
nature, not technical, and any solution or mitigation needs to address management processes. In short, project
management needs to ensure that sufficient emphasis is given to operations early enough in the project life cycle to
understand, analyze, and realistically cost operational requirements and resources.
While the study was not specifically designed to identify possible causes for the observed operations cost growth
drivers, there are a few likely candidates. As a series of independent, unique missions unified only by a goal to
further our understanding of the solar system, each new mission is to some extent unique. Thus, there is only a
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limited opportunity, primarily restricted to cruise operations, to build up the wealth of experience, the knowledge
base, and the suite of operational tools that make mission operations routine and easily estimated.
The NASA mission selection process is heavily driven by the emphasis on accomplishing the most science for
the least cost and risk. Phase E costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development in phases C and D.
Thus. while more emphasis is being placed on overall mission cost risk, traditional project management and
selection processes have concentrated on the technical risks during spacecraft development. In addition, there is a
perception that cost increases late in the development life cycle (near the start of or during operations) are "safe,"
that given the money already spent on spacecraft development, NASA will not cancel a project merely because of
cost increases during phase E. Finally; proposal and concept study fundin g is limited; proposal and project managers
must carefully manage the available resources and make difficult decisions to ensure that all critical trades and
analyses are accomplished. Taken together, these make the operations phase an obvious candidate for project
management to accept a greater risk of cost growth by takin g an optimistic approach to operations cost estimates or
limiting resources for early operations cost trades and analysis.
To reduce the programmatic risk resulting from operations cost growth; project managers need to ensure that
sufficient emphasis is placed on estimating operations support development and operations support staffing early in
the project life cycle. Project managers and system engineers should be aware of the potential areas of operations
cost growth: heritage and new technology assumptions, operational complexity, and science support tools, to ensure
that the necessary resources are available to analyze any operational impact or operational support requirement
along with equivalent spacecraft analysis in each phase. Finally, project managers need to be aware that operations
cost growth is not independent from growth in the overall mission cost. Figure 4 compares the percent increase in
operations (phase E) costs to the
percent increase in total mission life 	 Percent Total Life Cycle Cost for Phase E
cycle cost. The two are clearly 30.0
commensurate. While there is no
direct correlation between spacecraft 	 25.0
development cost growth and	 o	 u Initial Phase E1	 Cost(percen: of
operations cost growth (i.e., an 	 " 20.0 Initial Mission
increase is spacecraft development 	 v	 Cost)
cost was not linked to a resulting 	 15.0	 n an rert Phase
increase in operations cost), in each 	 E Cost ;Pcizcnt
case,	 operations	 costs	 stayed	 10.0	 Of Current
proportional to overall LCC even 	 a	
miss on cost}
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as much as 50%. Project manag 	
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potential impact of spacecraft
changes on operations. the	 Figure 4. Operations Cost Growth Compared to Total LCCpossibility of secondary impacts (e.
g., increased operational complexity) that can result from mission replans, as well as the potential for growth in
phase E costs independent from any other project issues.
To increase emphasis on early work to develop realistic operations support requirements and cost estimates, the
latest Discovery A0 3 has been modified to emphasize operations costs and cost risks. Reserves proposed as part of
the total LLC have been clearly identified as covering all phases of the mission life cycle, including phase E.
Proposer will need to justify the adequacy of the cost reserves and demonstrate an approach for maintaining
adequate unencumbered reserves through development and operations. Evaluation of the adequacy and robustness
of the technical plan will include the plan for mission operations and the flexibility to recover from problems during
both development and operations.
VI. Conclusion
In spite of increased emphasis over the past 20 years on operability and parallel support for development of
operations capabilities and the spacecraft ; D&NF projects are still experiencing significant cost overruns during
operations. These overruns are the direct result of late development of operations requirements, overly optimistic
assumptions regarding the savings resultin g from the use of heritage technology, inadequate analysis of the effect of
new technology on operations, delayed completion of ground system development work, and inadequate planning
for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and
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hardware/software refresh). However, there was no indication in the missions studied that the problem is technical in
nature, that new technology is required to solve the operational issues and contain operations cost growth. Rather the
study indicates that increased project management attention to operations requirements and staffing estimates from
the start of the project life cycle should mitigate to a large extent the cost growth seen in the missions studied.
Starting from the earliest initiation of mission forniulation, attention to operations concepts and requirements for all
aspects of the mission; a realistic look at tool and staffing requirements, and detailed supporting analyses should
enable projects to more accurately predict operations costs, and to ensure that those estimates evolve in concert with
the overall spacecraft design and development.
Acknowledgments
The Discovery & New Frontiers Program Office Life Cycle Cost Study was performed under the direction of
Paul Gilbert (MSFC), led by Bryan Barley (MSFC), and supported by Kenny Mitchell (MSFC-retired) and Marilyn
Newhouse (CSC).
References
'Barley, B., Gilbert, P., and Newhouse, M., "Improving the Life Cycle Cost Management of Planetary Missions," February
2010.
Tesq, L., Cancro, G. Jones, C., Ingham, M., Leitner, J., McDougal, J., Newhouse, M., Rice, E., Watson, D.; Wertz, J.,
"Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results for the Science Mission Directorate, Planetary Sciences Division," March
2009
3Draft Discovery 2010 Announcement of Opportunity, December 7, 2010.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
New 
Frontiers
Discovery
April 2010
0
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Marilyn Newhouse, CSC
Bryan Barley, MSFC
Allen Bacskay, MSFC
Dennon Clardy, MSFC
SpaceOps 2010 Conference
Planning and Estimation of Operations 
Support Requirements
New 
Frontiers
Discovery
April 2010 1
Juno
Mars Pathfinder
CONTOUR
ASPERA-3 
on Mars Express
D&NF Program Science Missions
– The Moon (Lunar Prospector, M3, GRAIL)
– Mars (Mars Pathfinder, ASPERA-3)
– Inner Planets (MESSENGER, Strofio)
– Outer Planets (New Horizons, Juno)
– Comets (CONTOUR, Stardust, Deep Impact, EPOXI, NExT)
– Asteroids (NEAR, Dawn)
– Interplanetary Space (Genesis)
– Extra-Solar System (Kepler)
Dawn
Genesis
Stardust
MESSENGER
NEAR
Lunar Prospector
M3 on Chadrayaan-1
New Horizons
Kepler
GRAIL
New 
Frontiers
Discovery
Operations Cost Growth
April 2010 2
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4
Ph
as
e 
E 
Co
st
:  
Pe
rc
en
t 
G
ro
w
th
Ph
as
e 
E 
D
ur
at
io
n:
  P
er
ce
nt
 C
om
pl
et
e
Phase E Complete (Duration) Phase E Cost Growth at Launch Total Phase E Cost Growth
• Four of the five showed growth 
ranging from 35% to 100
• Remaining mission controlled cost 
growth by cutting phase E duration 
and science support tool 
development 
• Phase E cost growth was 
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In the missions studied, all five operational missions experienced phase E 
cost growth resulting from an underestimate of the operational requirements 
• Underestimation of the tools required for science operations at the science targets
• Inadequate analysis of and planning for fault protection and fault management 
capabilities
• Underestimation of the overall complexity of operations activities and therefore the 
level of support for planning and executing onboard activities
• Overly optimistic assumptions regarding the use of heritage technology
• Over-reliance on heritage/multi-mission operations center systems and 
capabilities
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Deep space missions plan to take advantage of the long cruise phase to 
complete ground system capabilities, particularly science phase capabilities 
• Helps maintain critical knowledge and skills during the cruise to the science 
target
• Increases temptation to underemphasize the science phase requirements and 
design during project formulation
• Increases the risk that the tools and development effort will be significantly 
underscoped in early cost estimates
• Allows a decrease in development discipline
• Phase E development rarely implement s earned value management
• Equivalent  of CDR –level reviews, including independent experts, are rarely 
held during operations
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Project proposals do not adequately address requirements for hardware and 
software refresh over the life of a deep space mission
• Eliminating or minimizing hardware and operating system upgrades can appear to 
reduce risk
• Assumptions become untenable as a result of operating system upgrades and 
hardware obsolescence
• Assumptions can actually increase the risk of loss of science in the event that aging 
hardware fails during a critical mission event
Project proposals typically emphasis controlling routine cruise operations costs 
• Detailed science planning during cruise identifies the need for trained, expert 
personnel for science operations 
• Operations costs increase in order to bring in additional staff, or to the accelerate a 
planned staffing increase
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The primary cost growth drivers are not typically technical issues; the primary 
operations cost growth drivers are factors that could have been analyzed, 
understood, and estimated 
Potential causes
• Each new mission is to some extent unique
• Project management and selection processes have concentrated on the technical 
risks during spacecraft development
• Perception that cost increases late in the development life cycle (near the start of 
or during operations) are “safe”
• Proposal and concept study funding is limited
Project management mitigations
• Ensure that sufficient emphasis is placed on estimating operations support 
development and operations support staffing early in the project life cycle
• Maintain awareness of the potential areas of operations cost growth: heritage and 
new technology assumptions, operational complexity, and science support tools
• Ensure that the necessary resources are available to analyze the operational 
characteristics
• Remember that operations cost growth is not independent from growth in the 
overall mission cost
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The Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office Life Cycle Cost Study was performed under the 
direction of Paul Gilbert (MSFC), led by Bryan Barley (MSFC), and supported by Kenny Mitchell 
(MSFC-retired) and Marilyn Newhouse (CSC)
Operations costs are small (~10-25% ) compared to overall mission life cycle cost,  yet 
overruns decrease a program’s ability to sustain future mission flight rates 
The majority of the cost growth drivers seen in the D&NF study could have been 
avoided or significantly decreased by project management emphasis on early planning 
and realistic estimation
• Realistic assessment of multi-mission capabilities and additional support required 
by unique mission characteristics
• Realistic assessment of new and heritage spacecraft technology on operations
• Realistic assessment of overall mission complexity, including fault management, 
and the ability to reduce operations staff through previous mission experience
• Upfront planning for retaining or re-developing trained staff across a long cruise to 
the science target
• Carefully trading sustaining engineering and hardware/software refresh across the 
full mission operations phase against reduced phase E costs
